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COMMENTS ON THE  
INTERPRETATION ACT 2005 
DR. SEÁN PATRICK DONLAN* AND RÓNÁN KENNEDY†
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Interpretation Act 2005 consolidates previous 
legislation and contains some new provisions inspired by a Law 
Reform Commission report. These may bring about a subtle but 
significant change in the methods of statutory interpretation. 
However, the Act is silent on the permissibility of extrinsic aids 
in interpretation, particularly parliamentary debates, traditionally 
prohibited by the exclusionary rule. This should indicate that the 
prohibition continues but an examination of the debates on the 
2005 Act shows that the Oireachtas does not have a clear 
understanding of practice in the courts.
This article considers the impact of the Act, tracing the 
development of the traditional and modern approaches to 
interpretation. Placing these issues in a comparative context, it 
pays particular attention to the use of parliamentary history in 
light of English developments, European trends and recent Irish 
case law. It concludes that the Act requires the courts to take a 
more purposive approach to the interpretation of legislation but 
that in this instance, because the Oireachtas misunderstood 
practice, their desire to permit use of parliamentary debates is not 
reflected in the language of the Act. 
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II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 A. Historical Overview 
Methods of statutory interpretation in the English-speaking 
world have varied considerably, against a background of diverse 
views about the institutions of government. 
Viewed as a whole, the canons of interpretation 
represent a position taken by the judiciary on their 
constitutional role in relation to those who 
establish the political programme, those who have 
to carry it out, and those affected by it. The 
interests of these groups may well conflict, so that 
the canons adopted by the judges will effect a 
balance between them.1
Modern statutory construction is thus conducted on the basis of 
both formal statutory rules and judicial principles and informal, 
often implicit and unarticulated, assumptions.2
Judicial and legislative powers were fused for much of early 
English history. Law resided in the ‘common learning’ of the Inns 
and the courts. Most important for the future were the royal courts 
in which a law common to the kingdom evolved. For centuries, 
both judiciary and legislature were seen to declare the existing 
law rather than make it.3 For the same reason, statutes were read 
in light of pre-existing law, an assumption common to both 
legislators and judges. Medieval legislation was broadly phrased 
and both judicial and legislative reporting was limited. There 
were thus few authentic texts. Over time, a “new concept of 
legislation [and] a new reverence for the written text” emerged.4
_____________________________________________________
1 Bell and Engle, Cross on Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed., 1995), p. 4. 
2 For discussion of legal theory focusing on legislation, see Sunstein, “Norms 
in Surprising Places: The Case of Statutory Interpretation” (1990) 100 Ethics
803, Waldron, “The Dignity of Legislation” (1995) 54 Maryland Law Review
633 and Wintgens (ed.), Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to 
Legislation (2002). 
3 Like legislation itself, judicial “opinions were not sources of law, but simply 
evidence as to what the law was.” Baker, An Introduction to English Legal 
History (3rd ed., 1990), p. 227. 
4 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (3rd ed., 1990), p. 237. 
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Debates about the powers of monarchy, and consequently 
the legislature and judiciary, came to a head in the seventeenth 
century. Common lawyers aligned themselves with parliament in 
defence of the ‘ancient constitution’ against both the king and 
England’s numerous other jurisdictions. With the ‘Glorious 
Revolution’ and the Bill of Rights 1689 came a restored and more 
limited monarchy. Although parliamentary supremacy was in the 
ascendant in the eighteenth century, Blackstone continued to 
articulate a theory of both unlimited parliamentary power and a 
judiciary that acted as “oracles of the law”.5
The traditional methods of statutory construction are well-
known, if not always clearly differentiated. These are not strictly 
speaking rules, but are rather “general principles which guide the 
function of interpretation”.6 The ‘mischief rule’ was articulated as 
early as the sixteenth century (in Heydon’s Case7). This involved 
an analysis of existing law or social conditions to determine the 
problem the statute was intended to remedy. While this would 
seem to be a purposive approach necessitating a look at 
parliamentary history, it was frequently used by the courts to 
narrow the effect of legislation. It focused on legislative intent at 
only the most general and ‘objective’ level. 
Where clearly authentic, statutory text has always been 
significant to judicial interpretation. The ‘literal rule’ gives the 
words of the statute their literal, plain, or ordinary meaning. The 
approach was important to legal certainty and honoured (at least 
in appearance) the increasingly central role of parliament. The 
necessary corollary was the ‘exclusionary rule’, the judicial 
principle barring the use of parliamentary debates. The rule 
arguably emerges from the seventeenth century and concerns 
about breaching the parliamentary privilege of free speech under 
_____________________________________________________
5 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book the First (1765), p. 
69. 
6 Byrne and McCutcheon, The Irish Legal System (4th ed., 2001), p. 471. 
These have been presented as consistent with HLA Hart’s ‘rules of 
recognition‘ as well as Dworkin’s ‘principles’ used in his critique of Hart. Cf.
Bell and Engle, Cross on Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed., 1995), p. 42 and 
Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (6th ed., 1994), p. 1291.  
7 (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 E.R. 637. 
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the Bill of Rights. Its formal expression is typically dated to 
Willes J. in Millar v. Taylor (1769).8
The literal approach was, however, supplemented by the 
‘golden rule’. This permitted courts to avoid a literal reading 
when it would lead to an absurdity or, in some formulations, an 
injustice. This did not undermine parliament but recognised that it 
could not have intended such a result. 
These approaches were influenced by the absence of reliable 
parliamentary reporting. Like the incomplete nature of judicial 
reports, this continued well into the nineteenth century and was an 
especially strong argument against the use of parliamentary 
materials. Private compilations of laws, slip versions of statutes 
and the brevity of parliamentary journals left judges with very 
little to work with. 
On the back of critiques of the common law exemplified by 
Bentham, the nineteenth century saw legislative and judicial 
reporting improve, precedent harden into stare decisis, the 
absorption of non-common law courts into the common law, and 
the courts restructured with professional Law Lords at their head. 
Each of these came in the name of legal certainty and led to the 
triumph of positivism, both principled and practical, in England. 
This positivism was linked, too, to ideas of popular sovereignty, 
parliamentary supremacy, and rule of law considerations. With 
this came a shift towards the strict textualism and judicial 
formalism that still characterises the English legal system.9
_____________________________________________________
8 The rule, “however, was not followed by Willes J. himself, as he 
subsequently referred to the bill’s history, holding that the original preamble 
was ‘infinitely stronger’. Consequently, the very founding case on the 
exclusionary prohibition seems to be of somewhat dubious origin.” Beaulac, 
“Parliamentary Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of 
Admissibility or of Weight?” (1998) 43 McGill Law Journal 287, 292-293. 
9 “Unlike substantive reasons, which look to the rights of the parties of the 
parties to a case or the consequences of a judicial decision, formal reasons in 
law depend for their validity on the institutional status of the rule from which 
they originate. When a choice must be made between competing reasons, an 
applicable formal reason has in the normal run of things a mandatory force 
(mandatory formality). It will prevail over any contrary substantive reason that 
would otherwise decide the case. High mandatory formality, when it genuinely 
exists, makes the law more certain and predictable.” Goodall, “What Defines 
the Roles of a Judge?: First Steps Towards the Construction of a Comparative 
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For perhaps two centuries, statutes have been by far the 
most important source of law in common law systems. The 
extraordinarily detailed statutes of English law reflect an attempt 
by parliamentary draftsmen and the judiciary to promote legal 
certainty and reduce judicial discretion in the application of 
statutes. This has not always been successful, however, and much 
contemporary opinion supports the use of ‘plain language’ to 
promote these aims.10
 Even with the rise of theories of parliamentary 
sovereignty in England, case law interpreting legislation has been 
treated in much the same manner as common law precedent. 
Statutory interpretation comes with the gloss of previous court 
decisions. Justification for this, especially with a written 
constitution, must rely on a different foundation than that of 
precedent in areas developed by the courts of common law. There 
remains a sense in which legislation is inchoate until judicial 
interpretation occurs.11
B. Literal and Purposive Interpretation 
The majority of legislation does not give rise to queries 
regarding the intention of the legislature. When the issue arises, 
the various methods of interpretation guide or restrain the courts 
to varying degrees. Each in different ways attempts to arrive at 
legislative intent. 
Both the ‘intention’ and ‘purpose’ of the legislature are 
problematic concepts.12 Beyond the normal difficulties associated 
with any interpretation, attributing a genuinely common intent or 
purpose to a diverse body of individuals is unrealistic. This is 
particularly true in the case of legislation. Deputies may vote for a 
Method” (2000) 51 N.I.L.Q. 535, 537-538. The author also makes a number of 
preliminary observations about Ireland. 
10 See Law Reform Commission, Statutory Drafting and Interpretation: Plain 
Language and the Law (L.R.C. 61 – 2000), pp. 70-75. See also generally the 
Law Reform Commission’s Consultation Paper on Statutory Drafting and 
Interpretation: Plain Language and the Law (C.P. 14 – 1999). 
11 See Munday, ”The Common Lawyer’s Philosophy of Legislation” (1983) 14 
Rechtstheorie 191-203. 
12 See, e.g., MacCullum, “Legislative intent” (1965-1966) 75 Yale Law Journal
754 and Vogenauer, “What is the Proper Role of Legislative Intent in Judicial 
Interpretation?” (1997) 18 Statute Law Review 235. 
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bill for wider political purposes rather than support for the actual 
text.
In the initial evaluation of the statute, the literal ‘rule’ is still 
the preferred method. This is complicated by what H.L.A. Hart 
called the “open texture” of language.13 While this approach can 
be very narrowly literal, it is perhaps better seen as a ‘plain’ or 
‘ordinary’ meaning approach to statutory text.14 As such, it need 
not imply that the judge attributes a meaning to the 
words of a statute independently of their context or 
of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he 
adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation 
to the immediately obvious and unresearched 
context and purpose in and for which they are 
used.15
The approach is qualified by an exception for technical terms-of-
art (including legal) which are to be given the meaning specific to 
that field and may be liberal enough to include the text of the Act 
as a whole. This approach is commonly accepted here but even in 
its more robust expression has been strongly criticised in other 
jurisdictions.16
 C. Aids to Interpretation 
There are a number of additional aids available to the court. 
These are typically based on linguistic or institutional 
considerations and include general presumptions, maxims, and 
intrinsic and extrinsic material aids to interpretation. 
_____________________________________________________
13 Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., 1994), p. 128. See also pp. 127-136. 
14 See Summers and Marshall, “The Argument from Ordinary Meaning in 
Statutory Interpretation” (1992) 43 N.I.L.Q. 213. 
15 Bell and Engle, Cross on Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed., 1995), p. 32. 
16 “In reality, the ‘plain meaning’ can be nothing but the result of an implicit 
process of interpretation.” Justice L’Heureux-Dube, dissenting in Québec Inc. 
v. Québec (Régie des permis d’alcool) [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919 at 997 (emphasis in 
original). See also Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (1998-1999) 30 Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d’Ottawa 175 and 
Zander, The Law-Making Process (1999), pp. 121-30. 
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The general presumptions which apply to legislation 
include: constitutionality; compatibility with EU and international 
law; that all words in a statute have meaning; that those meanings 
are updated with time (the principle of updated construction or 
dynamic interpretation); that the legislature intends to make clear 
changes in the law; that penal, revenue, and similar statutes are to 
be strictly construed; and that statutes are not to have retroactive 
or extra-territorial effect.
There are also numerous legal maxims, for example, 
noscitur a sociis (a thing is known by its associates); generalia
specialibus non derogant (“a statute containing general subject 
matter is taken not to affect one which applies to a specific topic 
[unless it says so expressly]”); and expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius (to express one thing is to exclude another).17
Finally, there are material aids specific to the particular 
provision or enactment being interpreted, generally texts with 
definite relevance to the issue.  
Intrinsic or internal aids are “any material which is 
published with an Act, but is not a substantive provision of the 
Act”.18 This includes the long and short titles, the preamble, 
cross-headings, marginal notes, and punctuation. The last three 
are not always considered as they are not under the direct control 
of the Oireachtas. The 2005 Act generally excludes cross-
headings and marginal notes from consideration in construing an 
enactment, despite the Law Reform Commission recommending 
that this be permitted.19 There is a limited exception under section 
7 of the Act, discussed below. 
Extrinsic or external aids that go beyond the four corners of 
the statute are much broader, being “any material which sheds 
light on the background of the enactment of a particular 
statute”.20 These can serve to highlight the problem the legislation 
is intended to address or the solution it offers.21 As a matter of 
judicial policy, some extrinsic aids are accepted by the courts. 
_____________________________________________________
17 Graham, “In Defence of Maxims” (2001) 22 Statute Law Review 45. 
18 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 38. 
19 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 47. 
20 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 48. 
21 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 48. 
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Prior statutes have long been permissible extrinsic aids.22
Deciding which legislation met this requirement is typically left 
to judges, although it may be expressly stated in the statute. Law 
Reform Commission reports are also generally accepted.23
Legislative history, including amendments made to the text of a 
Bill in its progress through the Oireachtas, might also be included 
here. Numerous other extrinsic aids continue to be prohibited by 
the exclusionary rule. Most notably, Oireachtas debates are 
generally excluded.
The various approaches to the interpretation of legislation 
and the aids in that interpretation make clear that the process is 
neither simplistic nor mechanical.24
D. The Exclusionary Rule 
The exclusionary rule is a judicial policy which has not 
always been consistently applied.25 A number of rationales have 
been put forward for it.26
Some of these rationales relate to the relationship between 
the courts and parliament. First, the history of the Act is not 
known because it is not properly reported (a rationale which no 
longer applies). Also, to use parliamentary debates would be to 
admit parol evidence to construe a record (in its technical 
meaning). Further, Article 9 of the Bill of Rights (1689) states 
that “the freedom of speech, and debates and proceedings in 
parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court 
of place out of parliament”. Finally, the requirement of comity 
between the two branches of government should preclude the 
courts from discussing proceedings in parliament. 
_____________________________________________________
22 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 55.  
23 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, pp. 51-53. 
24 For a ‘realistic’ note, see Llewellyn, ‘Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed’ 
(1950) 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395. 
25 Oliver, “Pepper v Hart: A Suitable Case for Reference to Hansard” 1993 
Public Law 5, 7. 
26 The summary that follows is based on Bennion, “Hansard – Help or 
Hindrance? A Draftsman’s View of Pepper v. Hart” (1993) 14 Statute Law 
Review 149, 151-155. See also Vogenauer, “A Retreat from Pepper v Hart? A 
Reply to Lord Steyn” (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 629, 631-633. 
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There are also practical arguments. First, allowing reference 
to parliamentary debates in court might significantly alter 
legislative practice. Members of parliament might be more 
inclined to embed statements about legislation in debates in the 
hope that those comments could come to control the statute’s 
meaning. Second, the use of these materials would require 
additional time and skill from practitioners. This would, in turn, 
increase the cost of litigation. Third, the material found may not 
be a reliable indicator of the meaning of an enactment. Finally, 
even if instructed to maintain fidelity to statutory text, the use of 
parliamentary history will tend to undermine the authority of the 
text.
Perhaps the strongest argument for the exclusionary rule is 
that the text is the paramount document which the courts, lawyers 
and citizens consult in attempting to ascertain the intention of the 
legislature. This argument is thus rooted in the judicial policy and 
legislative acquiescence of at least a century.27 In several 
common law jurisdictions, however, the trend has been towards 
the relaxation or elimination of the rule. 
III. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY AND THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
A. Other Common Law Countries 
This is most obvious in the United States. There, as a result 
of historical and institutional factors, contemporary statutory 
interpretation routinely includes both the literal approach to 
construction and the use of parliamentary history to discover 
legislative purpose.28
The exclusionary rule was important in constitutional and 
statutory interpretation for much of America’s first century.29
That began to change, at least at the federal level, as early as 
_____________________________________________________
27 For additional arguments for and against the rule, see Lord Lester, “Pepper 
v. Hart Revisited” (1994) 15 Statute Law Review 10, 18-20. 
28 Eskridge et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation (2000), p. 289. 
29 Baade, “‘Original Intent’ in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses” 
(1991) 69 Texas Law Review 1001. 
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1860.30 The use of parliamentary history was made explicit in 
1892 in Holy Trinity Church v. U.S.31 In the early twentieth 
century, American legal realism and political progressivism 
further undermined confidence in literalism and judicial 
formalism. The exclusionary rule was formally repudiated in 
1940 in United States v. American Trucking Associations.32 This 
was linked to the jurisprudential thought of Lon Fuller and the 
‘legal process’ school of H.M. Hart and A.M. Sacks. Each
emphasised the search for legislative purpose and highlighted the 
collaborative role of the judiciary in the development of 
statutes.33
In addition to its history, the American relaxation of the 
exclusionary rule is related to divergent constitutional structures, 
institutional and intellectual differences corresponding to these 
structures, and cultural differences. American institutions, and 
consequently politics, are far more fragmented. Perhaps most 
importantly, the American separation of powers differs markedly 
from a parliamentary system in which the Executive and 
Legislature are effectively fused.34 The role of jurisprudence, 
doctrinal writing, formal codifications and model laws in the 
United States is also far greater. English law is more reliant on 
legislation and the result is that, in general, “English judges tend 
to adopt a more textual, literal approach, while American courts 
tend to take a more purposive and, therefore, substantive, 
approach.”35 Such differences are related to, among other things, 
_____________________________________________________
30 Beaulac, “Parliamentary Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of 
Admissibility or of Weight?” (1998) 43 McGill Law Journal 287, 298. The 
availability of legislative records at the state level varies considerably. 
31 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892). 
32 310 U.S. 534, 60 S. Ct. 1059 (1939). 
33 See Eskridge, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ in Patterson (ed.), A Companion to 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (1999), pp. 200-208. Fuller’s “The Case 
of the Speluncean Explorers” contrasted a series of then contemporary judicial 
styles in (1949) 62 Harvard Law Review 616. Cf. Cahn, Calmore, Coombs, 
Green, Miller, Paul, and Stein, “The Case of the Speluncean explorers: 
Contemporary proceedings” (1993) 61 George Washington Law Review 1754. 
34 See, e.g., Breyer, “On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes” (1992) 65 Southern California Law Review 845, 871. 
35 Atiyah and Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American law (1987), 
pp. 100-101. See especially chapters 4 and 11. See also Posner, “Reply: The 
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more precise English drafting, the greater likelihood of legislative 
correction and the value placed on formal legal certainty.36 In 
recent decades, American “[l]egislation scholarship has become 
cacophonous.”37 A wide variety of theories giving different 
values to statutory intent, purpose, and text have been expressed 
amongst American jurists, judges, and legislators. A decade ago, 
it was stated that 
[t]he three main theories today emphasize (1) the 
actual or presumed intent of the legislature 
enacting the statute (“intentionalism”); (2) the 
actual or presumed purpose of the statute 
(“purposivism” or “modified intentionalism”); and 
(3) the literal commands of the statutory text 
(“textualism”).38
In general, the use of parliamentary history is not unusual. 
Statutory interpretation “includes consideration of the common 
law, legislative history, and agency interpretations even when the 
statutory text has an apparent plain meaning… [but] these … 
usually do not trump a clear text”.39
In recent years a renascent textualism associated with 
Supreme Court Justice Scalia has emerged.40 This, too, has 
Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation” (2003) 
Michigan Law Review 952, 954 (comparing formalistic and pragmatic judicial 
roles) and Goodall, “What Defines the Roles of a Judge?: First Steps Towards 
the Construction of a Comparative Method” (2000) 51 N.I.L.Q. 535, 537-538. 
36 One commentator has suggested that American legislation has swelled to 
civilian proportions and consequently receives civilian treatment. Glenn, Legal
Traditions of the World (2000), p. 231. 
37 Posner, “Legislation and its Interpretation: A Primer” (1989) Nebraska Law 
Review 431, 434. 
38 Eskridge and Frickey, “Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning” 
(1989-1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 321, 324. The authors argue that judicial 
pragmatism is and ought to be the favoured policy. See also Freeman, 
“Positivism and Statutory Construction: An essay in the Retrieval of 
Democracy” in Freeman, Positivism today (1996). 
39 Eskridge et al, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation (2000), pp. 289-290.  
40 See Eskridge, “The New Textualism” (1989-1990) 37 UCLA Law Review
621 and Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
(1998). 
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generated significant criticism, especially of the politically 
conservative nature of American literalism.  
Textualism is not a theory about the semantics of 
language; as such it would have been too 
obviously mistaken. The preoccupation with 
‘ordinary meaning’ reflects a political stance, and 
one which is mostly concerned with the desirable 
limits of statutory regulation. The more judicial 
interpretation of statutes is confined to their 
‘ordinary meanings’, real or imagined, the more 
the ability of the legislature to achieve broad 
regulatory policies is constrained. 41
In American practice the ‘intentional’, ‘purposive’ and ‘textual’ 
methods of interpretation are not exclusive to one another. 
With institutional and intellectual influences different from 
either the United States or the United Kingdom, other common 
law jurisdictions have moved in a similar direction.42
In Australia, the exclusionary rule was “firmly 
entrenched”43 at the federal level until it was amended by the 
Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 1984. Several of the states 
(New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory) have also enacted similar 
legislation.44
In Canada, the exclusionary rule still officially applies but 
has been relaxed somewhat, particularly in constitutional and 
human rights cases. In Quebec, the traditional civil law approach, 
_____________________________________________________
41 Marmor, “The Immorality of Textualism” (2005) 38 Loyola Law Review
2063, 2077-2078. 
42 See Zander, The Law-Making Process (1999), pp. 160-163 and Beaulac, 
“Parliamentary Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of 
Admissibility or of Weight?” (1998) 43 McGill Law Journal 287, 296-308. See 
also L.R.C. 61 – 2000, 19-20 (on Australia and New Zealand). 
43 Commissioner for Prices and Consumer Affairs (S.A.) v. Charles Moore 
(Aust.) Ltd. (1977) 51 A.J.L.R. 715, 729, cited in Beaulac, “Parliamentary 
Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of Admissibility or of 
Weight?” (1998) 43 McGill Law Journal 287, 296. 
44 Beaulac, “Parliamentary Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of 
Admissibility or of Weight?” (1998) 43 McGill Law Journal 287, 296. 
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which allows the use of parliamentary history, is generally 
accepted but the Supreme Court of Canada has raised questions 
regarding the weight to given to them.
In New Zealand, the exclusionary rule was not strongly 
established and the courts began to shift away from it in 1985. 
The New Zealand Law Commission considered this question in 
1990 and thought it best to leave it to the courts to continue 
developing their own rules on the matter.  
B. The United Kingdom 
1. ‘Peeking’ 
Positivism, formalism, and textualism have long been 
dominant in English law.45 British practice was, however, 
changed in Pepper v Hart.46 There the House of Lords declared 
itself willing to examine parliamentary debates in particular 
circumstances. While the decision surprised many, it was clear 
that movement in the direction of admitting parliamentary history 
had begun some time before. English and Scottish Law 
Commissions had considered it a quarter-century earlier. The 
Renton Committee had done so again in the 1970s. Parliament 
also attempted to alter the rule by Interpretation Acts in the 
1980s. There were even moves from that direction from the 
bench. None of these was successful. 
Lord Denning led efforts to relax the exclusionary rule 
while on the Court of Appeal in the 1940s.47 He first rejected the 
strict application of the rule in Seaford Court Estates Ltd v. 
Asher48 but when he repeated this approach in Magor and St. 
Mellons RDC v. Newport Corporation,49 he earned a sharp 
_____________________________________________________
45 See Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America (1996), 
especially the discussion of “The Continental Character of the English Legal 
System” at p. 20 et seq..  
46 [1993] A.C. 593 (HL). 
47 The discussion that follows draws on Mullan, “Purposive Interpretation and 
Parliamentary Materials: Pepper v. Hart” in O’Dell (ed.), Leading Cases of the 
Twentieth Century (2000), pp. 469-72. 
48 [1949] 2 K.B. 481 (CA). 
49 [1950] 2 All E.R. 1226 at 1236 (CA). 
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rebuke from the House of Lords.50 This did not discourage him. 
In Davis v. Johnson he said: 
Some may say – and indeed have said – that 
judges should not pay any attention to what is said 
in Parliament. They should grope about in the dark 
for the meaning of an Act without switching on the 
light. I do not accede to this view … it is obvious 
that there is nothing to prevent a judge looking at 
these debates himself privately and getting some 
guidance from them. Although it may shock the 
purists, I may as well confess that I have 
sometimes done it. I have done it in this very case. 
It has thrown a flood of light on the position.51
As Lord Lester points out, judicial ‘peeking’ may be “unfair 
to the parties, who [have] no opportunity to make submissions as 
to the relevance of the parliamentary record to the issues before 
the court.”52
In the event, all of the Law Lords disagreed with Denning’s 
approach, but he was unrepentant. He went on to call the literal 
method “completely out of date”,53 a position which the Lords 
did not support,54 used excerpts from Hansard (reproduced in a 
textbook and consequently admissible),55 and again referred to 
parliamentary debates.56 The House of Lords was once more 
_____________________________________________________
50 [1952] A.C. 189 at 191 (HL) per Lord Simonds. 
51 [1979] A.C. 264 at 276-77 (CA and HL). 
52 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, “Pepper v. Hart Revisited” (1994) 15 Statute Law 
Review 10, 17.  He goes on to give an example from his own experience of 
litigation before the House of Lords in which he alluded to the possibility of 
the point at issue being discussed in parliament without explicitly referring to 
the record of the debate. 
53 Nothman v. London Borough of Barnett [1978] 1 All E.R. 1243 at 1246 
(CA). 
54 [1979] 1 All E.R. 142 at 151 (HL). 
55 R. v. Local Commissioner for Administration (ex parte Bradford 
Metropolitan City Council [1979] 2 All E.R. 881 at 898 (CA), referring to 
Wade, Administrative Law (4th ed., 1977), p. 821. 
56 Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton [1981] 2 All E.R. 724 (CA) 731 at 
733.  
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quick to quash these attempts to relax the exclusionary rule.57
During this time, however, other factors inclined towards 
purposivism. The experience of English judges with the more 
purposive European approach was important, as was the practice 
of other common law jurisdictions.58 The judicial use of other 
extrinsic aids, parliamentary acceptance of citation to Hansard 
(1980), and ever-wider wider access to parliamentary materials all 
contributed. The acknowledgement of ‘peeking’ also suggested 
that the use of parliamentary history was inevitable.59 Finally, 
changes in personnel in the House of Lords created scope for a re-
examination of the rule.60
2. Pepper v. Hart 
The facts and judgment in Pepper v. Hart have been dealt 
with in detail elsewhere. For our purposes, a brief summary will 
suffice. Malvern College gave fee concessions to its staff: their 
sons could be educated at the school for one-fifth of the fees 
charged to other pupils. The school retained an absolute 
discretion to withdraw this at any time but at the relevant time, it 
had surplus capacity and was able to admit the children of staff 
without turning away other boys. 
This concession was treated as an “emolument” for the 
purpose of income tax paid by the staff. The issue was whether 
the cash equivalent of this benefit should be determined by the 
marginal cost of educating one additional boy or a proportion of 
the overall costs of educating all of the pupils. The first method 
provided a smaller figure than the second and had been the 
_____________________________________________________
57 [1982] 1 All E.R. 1042 at 1055 (HL), per Lord Diplock. 
58 See Levitsky, ‘The Europeanization of the British Legal Style’ (1994) 42 
American Journal of Comparative Law 347 and Lewis, ‘Europeanisation of the 
Common Law’ in Jagtenberg, Örücü, and de Roo (eds), Transfrontier Mobility 
of Law (1995). 
59 See the confession of Lord Hailsham L.C. in 418 1 IL Official Reports (5th 
series) col 1346. Discussing Lord Scarman's Bill on the Interpretation of 
Legislation in the House of Lords on the 26th March 1981, Lord Hailsham said 
“The idea that we do not read these things is quite rubbish”. 
60 See Mullan, “Purposive Interpretation and Parliamentary Materials: Pepper 
v. Hart” in O’Dell (ed.), Leading Cases of the Twentieth Century (2000), pp. 
473-476.  
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practice of the Inland Revenue to use this for some time. The 
Inland Revenue then sought to use the second method. The 
taxpayers appealed this unsuccessfully to the High Court and to 
the Court of Appeal. 
In the House of Lords, the Appellate Committee heard the 
appeal and then before giving judgment decided that there would 
be a further hearing before an enlarged (from five to seven 
members) Appellate Committee to consider whether the 
exclusionary rule should be relaxed. The reason for this was that 
the Financial Secretary had made statements in Standing 
Committee dealing with the situation at issue which supported the 
argument of the taxpayers.61 On this basis, the appeal was 
successful, with six of the seven Law Lords holding that marginal 
cost was the appropriate basis for calculation. 
The decision was much more limited than it might first 
appear. Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated the new exception as: 
subject to any question of Parliamentary privilege, 
the exclusionary rule should be relaxed so as to 
permit reference to Parliamentary materials where 
(a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to 
an absurdity; (b) the material relied upon consists 
of one or more statements by a Minister or other 
promoter of the Bill together if necessary with 
such other Parliamentary material as is necessary 
to understand such statements and their effect; (c) 
the statements relied upon are clear.62
In addition to this ‘triple-lock’,63 Browne-Wilkinson went so far 
as to note that attempts to introduce parliamentary materials that 
_____________________________________________________
61 Oliver, “Pepper v Hart: A Suitable Case for Reference to Hansard” 1993 
Public Law 5, 6. 
62 [1993] A.C. 593 at 640 (HL). For a full discussion of how this rule was 
initially applied in the English courts, see Bates, “The Contemporary Use of 
Legislative History in the United Kingdom” (1995) 54 Cambridge Law 
Journal 127, 138-150.  
63 Mullan, “Purposive Interpretation and Parliamentary Materials: Pepper v. 
Hart” in O’Dell (ed.), Leading Cases of the Twentieth Century (2000), p. 495. 
                   Judicial Studies Institute Journal                     [6:1 108
did not meet these requirements would be met with orders for 
costs.
3. Practice after Pepper
The decision in Pepper was not as dramatic a change in 
judicial policy as was claimed at the time, but brought England 
closer to Commonwealth countries and to American strict 
textualism.64 This was greeted with both enthusiasm and 
criticism.65 It has been argued, however, that the courts have 
embraced a more liberal approach than Pepper permitted.66
Indeed, for many the decision suggested that the courts had 
approved an explicitly purposive approach in which 
parliamentary materials were always permissible.67 This judicial 
reaction may have undermined the limited ratio of Pepper.
Criticism of the decision, combining practical and increasingly 
political arguments focusing on the separation of powers,68 seems 
to have gained ground over time.  
In Melluish (Inspector of Taxes) v. BMI (No 3) Ltd.,69 Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson rebuked counsel for being over-enthusiastic 
about introducing parliamentary materials and seemed to add a 
fourth requirement that the statements cited should be “directed to 
the specific statutory provision under consideration or to the 
_____________________________________________________
64 Girvin, “Hansard and the Interpretation of Statutes” (1993) 22 Anglo-
American Law Review 475. 
65 See, e.g. Davenport, “Perfection—But at What Cost?” (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 
149; Styles, “The Rule of Parliament: Statutory Interpretation after Pepper v 
Hart” (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 151; Bennion, “Hansard – 
Help or Hindrance? A Draftsman’s View of Pepper v. Hart” (1993) 14 Statute 
Law Review 149; Bennion, “How They All Got It Wrong in Pepper v. Hart” 
(1995) British Tax Review 325. 
66 Mullan, “Purposive Interpretation and Parliamentary Materials: Pepper v. 
Hart” in O’Dell (ed.), Leading Cases of the Twentieth Century (2000), p. 476. 
67 Healy, “Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England and the 
United States: An Assessment of the Impact of Pepper v Hart” (1999) 35 
Stanford Journal of International Law 231. 
68 Vogenauer, “A Retreat from Pepper v Hart? A Reply to Lord Steyn” (2005) 
25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 629, 636. 
69 [1996] A.C. 454 (HL) at 481-482. 
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problem raised by the litigation”.70 Speaking at the 1995 
Inaugural Lecture of the Statute Law Society, Lord Renton 
suggested that the relaxation of the rule led to an increase in the 
cost of litigation and would be superseded.71 Even Lord Lester, 
who had been counsel for the taxpayer in Pepper, expressed 
concern about the need to exercise “a strict and disciplined 
approach to the use of extrinsic aids to construction”.72 In an 
article, Lord Hoffman raised some practical difficulties with the 
decision.73 Two years later, Lord Millet went so far as to call for 
it to be abolished by statute.74 There followed the Hart Lecture 
which Lord Steyn, a Lord of Appeal, gave at Oxford in May 
2000.75 Initially a supporter of the decision,76 he became 
concerned about its implications.77 Most of these concerns mirror 
those discussed in Section II. Over time, he concluded that the 
case did not represent good law.78
The issue came up for consideration again in the House of 
Lords in R v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions Ex p. Spath Holme Ltd.79 There, both Lords 
Bingham and Hope sought to ensure the strict requirements of 
Pepper be met.  In Spath Holme and subsequently in R v. A,80
Lord Steyn put forward an argument that Pepper allows 
_____________________________________________________
70 [1996] A.C. 454 at 481, cited in Vogenauer, “A Retreat from Pepper v Hart?
A Reply to Lord Steyn” (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 629, 631. 
71 Mullan, “What is the Case for Pepper v Hart?” (2004) 26 D.U.L.J. (n.s.) 235, 
240. 
72 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, “Pepper v. Hart Revisited” (1994) 15 Statute Law 
Review 10, 21. 
73 Lord Hoffmann, “The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings” (1997) 
111 South Africa Law Journal 656. 
74 Lord Millett, “Construing Statutes” (1999) 20 Statute Law Review 107. 
75 Subsequently published as Steyn, “Pepper v Hart: A Re-examination” (2001) 
21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 59. 
76 See Steyn, “Does Legal Formalism Hold Sway in England?” (1996) CLP 43.  
77 See Steyn, “Interpretation: Legal Texts and their Landscapes: The Coming 
Together of the Common Law and Civil Law” in Markesinis (ed.) The Clifford 
Chance Millennium Lectures (2000).  
78 Steyn, “Pepper v Hart; A Re-examination” (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 59, 70. 
79 [2001] 2 W.L.R. 15 (HL). 
80 [2001] 3 All E.R. 1. 
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parliamentary material to be used only as an estoppel against the 
executive.
In Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,81 all 
of the Law Lords refused to consider ministerial statements on the 
grounds that they were unclear and inconclusive. In R (on the 
application of Westminister City Council) v. National Asylum 
Support Service,82 Lord Steyn again appeared to limit the scope 
of Pepper”83 He repeated his arguments in a lecture in 2002.84
They were echoed judicially in Wilson v. First County Trust,85
where the House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal for being 
too permissive in admitting parliamentary materials.86 While 
Steyn’s argument that Pepper creates an estoppel mechanism has 
been widely supported,87 his appraisal has been challenged.88
This debate over the limits of the exclusionary rule suggests 
again the importance of legal conventions in different common 
law jurisdictions.89 It may also suggest a gap between principle 
and practice. Contrary to judicial commentary on Pepper, the 
leading English texts on statutory interpretation suggest that there 
is a single, if multifaceted, rule that attempts to balance text and 
context. As Bennion writes: 
The so-called literal rule of interpretation 
nowadays dissolves into a rule that the text is the 
primary indication of legislative intention, but that 
_____________________________________________________
81 [2002] UKHL 32. 
82 [2002] 4 All E.R. 654. 
83 [2002] 4 All E.R. 654 at 658. 
84 Lord Steyn, “The Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts” 
(2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 5. 
85 [2003] 4 All E.R. 97. 
86 See Kavanagh, “Pepper v Hart and Matters of Constitutional Principle” 
(2005) L.Q.R. 98, 112-114 for a full discussion of this case. 
87  See McDonnell v Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees [2004] 1 All 
E.R. 641 at 654-655 and Bennion, “Pepper v Hart and Executive Estoppel” 
(2006) 170 J.P. 167. Cf. Kavanagh, “Pepper v Hart and Matters of 
Constitutional Principle” (2005) 121 L.Q.R. 98. 
88 See the strong critique of Steyn in Vogenauer, “A Retreat from Pepper v 
Hart: A Reply to Lord Steyn” (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 629. 
89 Some American commentators have written that “[a] final lesson of Pepper
is that “plain meaning” is itself highly artifactual.” Eskridge et al., Legislation 
and Statutory Interpretation (2000), p. 312. 
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the enactment is to be given a literal meaning only 
where this is not outweighed by more powerful 
interpretative factors.90
He elsewhere articulates this as the ‘Global method’ of 
interpretation across the common law world. These comments are 
perhaps best understood as descriptive expressions of actual 
judicial practice.91 If this is true, Bennion’s hostility to the 
decision in Pepper is a critical evaluation of such practice.
C. Continental and European jurisdictions 
In light of the impact which European continental 
approaches to statutory interpretation are beginning to have on the 
common law, it is useful to consider these briefly.92
Continental jurisdictions vary widely and, as with the 
common law, modern approaches to the interpretation of 
legislation are rooted in unique historical traditions. Following the 
revolution in France, a “référé législatif was introduced by the 
legislature which forced judges to refer a case to the legislature on 
questions of statutory construction…. [It] soon proved 
unworkable and was finally abolished in 1837.”93 Similarly, the 
doctrines of the nineteenth-century school of exegesis suggested a 
mechanical process of adjudication in which judgments were the 
result of straightforward syllogistic reasoning. This paralleled 
similar developments in the Anglo-American world and 
complimented French theories of parliamentary sovereignty and 
Rousseau’s volonté générale (‘general will’). While there remain 
_____________________________________________________
90 Bennion, Understanding Common Law Legislation, p. 41 and on the ‘Global 
method’ of common law interpretation, see p. 84.  
91 Cf. Bell and Engle, Cross on Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed., 1995), p. 49; 
Freeman, “The Modern English Approach to Statutory Construction” in 
Freeman (ed.), Legislation and the Courts (1997); Twining and Miers, How to 
do Things with Rules: a Primer of Interpretation (1999), pp. 281-282. 
92 See MacCormick and Summers (eds), Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative 
Study (1991) and Goodall, “Comparative Statutory Interpretation in the British 
Isles” (2000) 13 Ratio Juris 364. 
93 Steiner, French Legal Method (2002), 71. 
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traces of this continental formalism, it was long ago the subject of 
a more realistic appraisal.94
As in the common law, legislative drafting and statutory 
interpretation are closely connected. Drafting, especially of 
codifications, is characterized by broad language and rarely 
descends into the detail of the common law statute.95 While 
judges are also constrained by legislative text, its phrasing makes 
reference to statutory context both more necessary and more 
common. Precisely because both texts and conventions are 
different, continental judges make more use of parliamentary 
history or travaux préparatoires.
This might seem to invite considerable discretion, but is 
limited in a number of ways. Parliamentary history is generally 
used only where the text is unclear and may not displace plain 
meaning. There is also a strong institutional emphasis on the 
limited role of the judge. Finally, the absence of a strong doctrine 
of precedent in continental law means that individual judicial 
decisions do not normally result in binding law beyond the instant 
case (res judicata).96
The different methods of interpretation and the terms used 
to identify the methods vary considerably. While civilians may 
draw on centuries of experience with doctrinal and judicial 
interpretation of texts, the past two centuries have been 
importantly influenced by codification and constitutionalism. 
Civilians seek parliamentary intent, the ‘ratio legis’. Where a 
literal reading results in absurdity, it may give way to systemic 
interpretation in which the text is contextualised within existing 
laws and legal principles. The age of the legislation, its place in 
the legal system and general coherence in the legal order are all 
relevant factors. Because interpretive assumptions are shared with 
_____________________________________________________
94 See for example Gény, Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé 
positif  2 vols, (2nd ed., 1954). 
95 Smith, “Legislative Drafting: English and Continental” (1980) 1 Statute Law 
Review 14, 16. The ‘special’ or supplementary legislation that surrounds the 
codes and administrative decrees may be as detailed as English statutes. 
96 Civilians frequently maintain a system of persuasive, rather than binding, 
precedent. Previous decisions are followed on equitable grounds, especially 
when a consistent stream of decisions (jurisprudence constante) suggests itself 
as best evidence of the meaning of the law interpreted. 
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the legislature, legislation is drafted with judicial use of such 
materials in mind.
The interpretation of the law of the European Union is more 
complicated.97 European law necessitates a more permissive 
approach to the use of travaux préparatoires. Even more than in 
the national systems of the continent, European legislation is 
drafted in general terms and in pursuit of broad aims and 
purposes. As a result, European courts have long followed 
‘schematic’ and ‘teleological’ approaches to interpretation. In this 
context, the former “involves placing the provision in question in 
its context and interpreting it in relation to the broader scheme of 
which it forms a part.”98 The provision is thus integrated into 
existing law. The latter method of teleological interpretation is the 
most important, but the two are often used together.99 While this 
resembles the national continental approaches, the investigation 
of purpose appears to happen more quickly in European law. In 
fact, it has been suggested that even for civilian jurisdictions,
Europeanisation gives rise to two conflicting 
developments. On the one hand, it reinforces 
deductive reasoning in the areas covered by EC 
directives, on the other hand it gives rise to more 
explicit policy reasoning where the courts draw 
inspiration from comparative law.100
In this way, European law has influenced (and indeed been 
influenced by) both civil and common law jurisdictions.
_____________________________________________________
97 See Bell and Engle, 105-12 and McLeod, “Literal and Purposive Techniques 
of Legislative Interpretation: Some European Community and English 
Common law Perspectives” (2003-2004) 29 Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 1109. 
98 Millett, “Rules of Interpretation of EEC legislation” (1989) 10 Statute Law 
Review 163, 168. See Ibid., 168-169. 
99 Fennelly, “Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice” (1997) 20 
Fordham International Law Journal 656, 664. This was articulated as early as 
Van Gend en Loos (1963). Cf. Lord Denning in Buchanan & Co v Babco Ltd
[1977] Q.B. 208, 213. 
100 Smits, “The Europeanisation of National Legal Systems: Some 
Consequences for Legal Thinking in Civil Law Countries” in Van Hoecke 
(ed.), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (2004). 
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While “[t]he British doctrine of purposive construction … is 
markedly more literalist than the European variety, and permits 
strained construction only in comparatively rare cases”, neither 
similarities nor differences should be exaggerated.101 These 
various legislative and judicial policies in common, civil, and 
European law have been influenced by their unique history, 
conventions and institutions. They underscore the fact that 
“[u]ltimately, the choice of what to consider in statutory 
interpretation must be decided within the context of the particular 
system.”102
IV. THE IRISH COURTS 
A. The Literal and Purposive Approaches 
The Law Reform Commission discussed the different 
approaches to statutory interpretation here.103 ‘Literal’ and 
‘purposive’ interpretation “refer to two ends of a spectrum, one 
concerned with the meaning of particular words and phrases and 
the other with the overall result which the legislature may wish to 
achieve.”104 While they saw their proposal as a ‘moderately 
purposive approach’, they did not believe that this was a change 
in practice. 
 The literal approach, exemplified in Rahill v. Brady, is 
somewhat conservative.105 This concerned whether a cattle mart, 
held twice weekly throughout the year, was entitled to a ‘special 
event’ licence under the Intoxicating Liquor Act 1962. Budd J. in 
the Supreme Court, stated that “the ordinary meaning of words 
should not be departed from unless adequate grounds can be 
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101 Bennion, Understanding Common Law Legislation, 154. Cf. the discussion 
in Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (7th ed., 2001), pp. 1410-
1421. 
102 Jordan, “Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance of 
English Practice” (1994-1995) 29 University of San Francisco Law Review 1, 
28. 
103 The summary which follows draws heavily on Chapter 2 of L.R.C. 61 – 
2000. 
104 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 5. See comments on ‘purpose’, ‘object’, and ‘intention’ 
in Ibid., 9. 
105 [1971] I.R. 69 (SC). 
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found in the context in which the words are used to indicate that a 
literal interpretation would not give the real intention of the 
legislature.”106
A similar approach was taken in Murphy v. Bord 
Telecom,107 where Keane J. held that if female claimants under 
the Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act 1974 could only point to male 
colleagues who were paid more for lesser work rather than more 
for ‘like work’ as the literal reading of the act required, their 
claim had to fail. (This decision was subsequently held to be 
incorrect by the European Court of Justice.108)
There is also a more purposive approach. In Nestor v. 
Murphy,109 the Supreme Court held that a literal reading of the 
Family Home Protection Act 1976 to prevent the sale of a family 
home where the wife had not given her consent in advance but 
(because she was a joint tenant of the property) she was joining in 
the conveyance was “outside the spirit and purpose of the Act”.110
In Mulcahy v. Minister for the Marine,111 Keane J. limited 
the wide-ranging powers of the Minister to grant licences for 
aquaculture projects under the Fisheries (Consolidation) Act 1959 
in light of the regulatory framework set out in other statutes, 
particularly the Fisheries Act 1980.112 He felt that 
[w]hile the Court is not, in the absence of a 
constitutional challenge, entitled to do violence to 
the plain language of an enactment in order to 
avoid an unjust or anomalous consequence, that 
does not preclude the Court from departing from 
the literal construction of an enactment and 
adopting in its place a teleological or purposive 
approach, if that would more faithfully reflect the 
_____________________________________________________
106 [1971] I.R. 69 at 86 (SC). 
107 [1986] I.L.R.M. 483 (HC) and [1989] I.L.R.M. 53. 
108 Case 157/86, Murphy v. Bord Telecom [1988] E.C.R. 445; [1988] C.M.L.R. 
879. 
109 [1979] I.R. 326 (SC). 
110 [1979] I.R. 326 at 328 (SC). 
111 High Court, 4 November 1994. 
112 See the discussion of the case in L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 3. 
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true legislative intention gathered from the Act as 
a whole.113
Although the Interpretation Act 2005 does not adopt the wider 
purposive approach of the Law Reform Commission, the 
Commission singled out the case as an exemplar of a purposive 
method.114 As they saw it, “[t]he rule as enunciated is that a court 
may depart from a literal reading of an enactment where there is 
an alternative meaning available to the court which plainly 
reflects more accurately the purpose of the Act.”115 While the 
wording of the judgment and parts of the Commission’s Report 
might suggest a single reading of text for purpose, both the ratio
of Mulcahy and the Commission’s recommendations are probably 
better seen as the two-step process discussed below.
It should be noted that the issue of whether the two 
Fisheries Acts involved were in pari materia did not arise as an 
issue to be decided because the 1980 Act explicitly provided that 
all of the Fisheries Acts were to be ‘construed together as one’. It 
is therefore unclear where the boundaries of “as a whole” would 
be drawn if this was not stated in the legislation. 
This purposive approach has even been used in criminal 
cases, where it can be to the disadvantage of a defendant. In DPP
(Ivers) v. Murphy,116 the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a 
High Court decision based on the literal interpretation of section 
6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997. 
Here, a measure designed to reduce the need for members of An 
Garda Síochána to attend court allowed for the use of a certificate 
as proof of arrest, charge and caution but not as proof of the 
condition precedent to the use of that certificate, namely an arrest 
otherwise than under a warrant. The court felt that a more modern 
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113 High Court, 4 November 1994 at 23. On ‘construction as a whole’, see 
Bennion, Understanding Common Law Legislation, 55.  
114 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 20. 
115 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 13. 
116 [1999] 1 I.L.R.M. 46 (SC). See the comments on DPP (Ivers) and the Law 
Reform Commission in Kirby, “Towards a Grand Theory of Interpretation: 
The case of Statutes and Contracts” (2003) 24 Statute Law Review 95, 104-
105. 
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approach would allow this to be proved also by the certificate as 
to do otherwise would defeat the purpose of the section. 
It is important to note that the 2005 Act does not go this far. 
Any alteration to existing methods of statutory interpretation only 
applies to civil matters. To go further might be unconstitutional as 
provisions imposing penal and other sanctions must be interpreted 
strictly.117
From the foregoing caselaw, therefore, as in England, 
‘purposive’ interpretation refers to departures from the literal 
approach.118 The traditional mischief and golden rules seem to 
have merged into a single ‘schematic-teleological’ approach.119
Any distinction between the two words is probably of greater 
interest to academics than to modern practitioners.120 In general, it 
would seem that the new approach is restricted to looking at 
intrinsic aids (discussed below) and the wider statutory context or 
legislation in pari materia, i.e. dealing with the same subject 
matter, as an indicator of purpose. It does not appear to extend to 
other extrinsic aids. The Irish judiciary look to the ‘objective’ 
meaning of the words used rather than the ‘subjective’ or actual 
intentions of the Parliament concerned.121 The search for this 
objective intent remains problematic, but aims to reduce judicial 
discretion and promote clarity in legislation.122
There are two steps involved in this approach. First, the 
judge examines the ‘plain language’ of the Act. Second, if on this 
literal interpretation, there remains ambiguity, obscurity or 
absurdity, the judge may move to divine the ‘plain intention’ of 
_____________________________________________________
117 Byrne and McCutcheon, The Irish Legal System (4th ed., 2001), pp. 503-
505. 
118 Bennion, Understanding Common Law Legislation, p. 42.  
119 See for example Denham J. in DPP (Ivers) v. Murphy, [1999] 1 I.L.R.M. 46 
at 109-111 (SC). 
120 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 5. 
121 Cf. “We often say that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, but 
that is not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words which 
Parliament used. We are seeking not what the Parliament meant but the true 
meaning of what they said.” Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke 
Waldhof-Aschaffenburg (A.G.) [1975] A.C. 591 at 626; All E.R. 810 (H.L.) 
(Lord Reid). 
122 Greenberg, “The Nature of Legislative Intent and Its Implications for 
Legislative Drafting” (2006) 27 Statute Law Review 15. 
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the Oireachtas through the text of the Act as a whole and any 
additional permitted aids to interpretation. If this reflects current 
practice, it is perhaps the most limited purposive approach in any 
common law jurisdiction.
Note that the line dividing literal and purposive 
interpretations may not always be clear. As a practical matter, it 
will be difficult to read the whole text literally without also 
reading it purposively. Also, the schematic-teleological approach 
resembles Irish constitutional methods of interpretation as well as 
the approaches taken in interpreting European law.123 The same 
terminology has, however, far broader applications in European 
law, both national continental and European Union law.124
B. Parliamentary History and the Exclusionary Rule 
Over time, the attitude of the Irish courts to the use of 
parliamentary history has become less clear, despite the issue 
being considered in a recent Supreme Court decision.125 There is, 
as yet, no Pepper v. Hart in this jurisdiction. The indications are 
that there will not be. 
Although Costello J. strongly approved of their use in 
Wavin Pipes v. Hepworth Iron Ltd.,126 Keane J. in Wadda v. 
Ireland felt there must be some “obscurity, ambiguity or potential 
absurdity in the relevant provisions which would justify the court 
having recourse to what was said in the Oireachtas in order to 
ascertain the legislative intention.”127 Walsh J. in DPP v. 
Quilligan stated that the search for intention is confined to the 
text of legislation: “Whatever may have been in the minds of the 
members of the Oireachtas when the legislation was passed, in so 
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123 Cf. chapter 1.1 of Kelly (Hogan and Whyte, eds.), The Irish Constitution
(4th ed., 2003).  
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Fordham International Law Journal 656, 656.  
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L.R.C. 61 – 2000, pp. 57-62. 
126 High Court, 8 May 1981, reported in (1982) 8 Fleet Street Reports 32. See 
Casey, “Statutory interpretation:  A new departure” (1981) 3 D.U.L.J. (n.s.) 
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far as their intention can be deduced, as it must be, from the 
words of the statute.”128
Amongst the issues which arose in Howard v. 
Commissioners of Public Works was the admissibility of 
parliamentary materials. In the Supreme Court, Finlay C.J. felt 
that reference to parliamentary debates as an aid to interpretation 
was not permitted.129
In DPP v. McDonagh, Costello P. stated that 
Our courts do not and should not adopt such a 
rigid exclusionary rule … and it seems to me that 
the Court should have regard to any aspect of the 
enactment's legislative history which may be of 
assistance. … As the legislative history of the 
section being considered in this case throws very 
considerable light on its proper construction it 
would be wrong of this Court to ignore it.130
Significantly, he did not expressly refer to or quote from any 
parliamentary material as such. His source of information was a 
textbook, a source held to be acceptable.131 He also used 
‘legislative history’ in a broad sense, discussing the background 
to the change in the law rather than the parliamentary debates 
while that change was being made. 
In In re National Irish Bank Ltd.132 counsel urged the court 
to examine the Dáil Debates. Relying on the statement quoted 
above from McDonagh, Shanley J. held that “Dáil Debates are, of 
course, a record of part of the legislative history of an Act of the 
Oireachtas, and it seems clear that I can look at these debates in 
construing [the section at issue].”133 However, an examination of 
the debate to which counsel referred him proved of little 
_____________________________________________________
128 [1986] I.R. 495 at 511 (emphasis added).  
129 [1994] 1 I.R. 101 at 140 (SC). See Hogan, “Statutory Interpretation–The 
Mullaghmore Case” (1993) 15 D.U.L.J. (n.s.) 243, 248-253. 
130 [1996] 1 I.R. 565 at 570 (SC). 
131 [1996] 1 I.R. 565 at 572 (SC). 
132 [1999] 3 I.R. 145 (HC). 
133 [1999] 3 I.R. 145 at 164 (HC). 
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assistance. Although the decision was appealed to the Supreme 
Court, the debates were not referred to there. 
In An Blascaod Mór Teo. v. Commissioners of Public Works 
(No. 2), Budd J. contended that a Bill “differs from the 
parliamentary records of debates.” He therefore thought, “with 
some trepidation, … that the court [was] entitled to look at the 
wording of the Bill relevant to [the section being interpreted] … 
as it may assist in interpreting the Act and the section.”134 Again, 
it must be noted that Budd J. was examining the text of the Bill 
rather the debates in the Oireachtas.  
C. Crilly v. Farrington 
The most extensive (but unfortunately not definitive) 
Supreme Court decision on the issue is Crilly v. Farrington,135 in 
which final judgment was given in early July 2001. Here, in the 
wake of the Commission’s Report, the Supreme Court went to 
great lengths to express its reluctance to relax the exclusionary 
rule.136 In the High Court, Geoghegan J. referred in passing to 
Pepper but relied instead on the more liberal precedent of 
McDonagh, which he held permitted him to rely on parliamentary 
papers in construing legislation even where there was no 
ambiguity. He dismissed Howard on the grounds that any 
statements there were obiter. He held that the statements of 
Costello P. in McDonagh were also obiter. Without claiming that 
ministerial statements had long been used for statutory 
construction in Ireland, he noted that it was “well within the spirit 
and intent” of Howard “that in certain circumstances such a 
ministerial statement could be availed of.”137 He did not say what 
those circumstances were but went on to examine the relevant 
ministerial statement and found that it was of assistance in 
confirming the view which he had already formed. 
_____________________________________________________
134 [2000] 1 I.R. 1 at 4. 
135 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 (SC). 
136 Mullan, “What is the case for Pepper v Hart” (2004) 26 D.U.L.J. 235, 257. 
See also Ibid., 249 et seq.; Mullan, “Purposive Interpretation and Parliamentary 
Materials: Pepper v. Hart” in O’Dell (ed.), Leading Cases of the Twentieth 
Century (2000), 491; L.R.C. 61 – 2000, 57. 
137 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 265 (SC). 
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In the Supreme Court, this issue was dealt with at some 
length by four members of the unanimous five-judge court which 
heard the appeal. 
Denham J. found that section was “a clear section. The 
words are plain. There is no ambiguity. It is a situation where no 
complex canons of construction are needed.”138 Although this 
meant that it was “not necessary to proceed to determine the 
admissibility in evidence of parliamentary debates”, she struck “a 
note of caution” on this issue.139 She set out a number of reasons 
why she was “not persuaded that good reason has been indicated 
in this case for changing or developing the common law in this 
jurisdiction”,140 chiefly that “[t]o hold that parliamentary debates 
are admissible would be an alteration in the law and an alteration 
which would have a profound effect”.141 However, she went on to 
say that she “agreed then and … now with Costello P.'s judgment 
in McDonagh that such an approach should not be excluded. A 
court has a discretion to consider such legislative history.”142 She 
emphasised that McDonagh does not deal with the admissibility 
of parliamentary debates.143 Murphy J. agreed with her 
decision.144
Murray J. surveyed the status of the exclusionary rule in the 
United Kingdom and the United States but expressly refused to 
consider whether Pepper was correctly decided. He distinguished 
Bourke v. Attorney General145 on the grounds that it dealt with 
the interpretation of an international treaty, where the use of 
travaux préparatoires is common. He also emphasised the 
distinction between ‘legislative history’ and ‘parliamentary 
history’ noted above146 and distinguished McDonagh on the 
question of the admissibility of parliamentary debates as any 
statements on the matter there were obiter. He preferred instead 
_____________________________________________________
138 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 278 (SC). 
139 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 280 (SC). 
140 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 283 (SC). 
141 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 282 (SC). 
142 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 283 (SC). 
143 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 281 (SC). 
144 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 285 (SC). 
145 [1972] I.R. 36. 
146 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 292 (SC). 
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Quilligan and Howard which excluded the use of such material. 
He went on to summarise the constitutional provisions dealing 
with the passage of legislation and said: 
It is by laws so adopted and promulgated that the 
citizens are bound. It is to the text of those laws as 
promulgated that they, or their legal advisors, look 
to ascertain the obligations or rights for which they 
provide or regulate.147
In insisting on this objective intention of the Oireachtas’ 
words rather than their subjective intentions, he cited Lord 
Nicholls in Spath Holme Ltd.148
As a consequence of this,
[a]ny proposal that the courts should go behind the 
constitutionally expressed will of the Oireachtas so 
as to rely on the statement of one member of one 
house, whatever his or her status, must be 
approached with circumspection and constitutional 
prudence. To go behind a will so expressed so as 
to look at such statement and impute an intent 
expressed by one member to the Oireachtas as a 
whole may, and I use that word guardedly, risk 
compromising the legislative process and the role 
of other members of the Oireachtas.149
He identified two difficulties which would arise as a result 
of the admissibility of parliamentary debates: a distortion of those 
debates150 and an increase in the complexity and cost of 
litigation.151 He felt that these outweighed any advantages.152
Even if they did not, the difficulties in identifying parliamentary 
_____________________________________________________
147 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 295 (SC). Cf. Gallagher, “Parliament” in Coakley and 
Gallagher (eds.), Politics in the Republic of Ireland (3rd ed., 1999). 
148 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 295-96 (SC). 
149 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 296 (SC). 
150 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 297 (SC). 
151 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 298 (SC). 
152 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 299 (SC). 
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intent in the debates (particularly as the question of ambiguity is 
most likely to arise in situations which the Oireachtas did not 
consider) ruled them out.153 However, like Denham J., he was not 
willing to prohibit them out completely: 
recourse to statements of ministers could have 
implications for the parliamentary process, I put it 
no further than that, which the courts should avoid 
unless there are cogent and countervailing judicial 
reasons for doing so. In my view the existence of 
such cogent or countervailing judicial reasons have 
not been demonstrated by the claimant.154
He acknowledges, however, that this is not a strict constitutional 
rule: 
The judicial aids to the construction of statutes … 
are not fundamental principles.… They may be 
changed or adapted.… There is no rule of law 
which prohibits a review of a rule of 
construction.155
McGuinness J. shared these concerns of principle and 
practice and felt, like her colleagues, that there was no need to 
refer to the parliamentary debates in resolving the case but that 
the question was open for the future.156
Fennelly J. was in agreement. He considered McDonagh but 
set out as a counterpoint an extensive quotation from In re Illegal 
Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill. There, counsel quoted extensively 
from Oireachtas debates but the court refused to make use of 
these.157 He acknowledged that it was not clear whether that court 
had intended to make a distinction between the meaning and the 
purpose of a statutory provision but felt that in any case, “such a 
distinction must be too theoretical to be a reliable guide to the 
_____________________________________________________
153 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 299 (SC). 
154 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 300 (SC). 
155 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 288 (SC). 
156 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 301-303 (SC). 
157 [2000] 2 I.R. 360 at 370-372 (SC). 
                   Judicial Studies Institute Journal                     [6:1 124
circumstances in which extraneous materials will be 
admissible”.158
He echoed the distinction of Bourke and McDonagh and felt 
that the approach of American courts was not familiar enough to 
the Irish courts to serve as a useful source of inspiration.159 Nor 
did he consider it necessary to consider the situation in Australia, 
New Zealand or Canada.160 He did, however, deal with Pepper at
some length. He felt that the first condition for admissibility of 
parliamentary debates (that the legislation is ambiguous, obscure 
or leads to an absurdity) was not workable, particularly given the 
division of the House of Lords as to whether or not it was met in 
Spath Holme Ltd. 
This remains the most definitive statement to date from the 
Supreme Court on this issue.161 It is, on one level, somewhat 
unsatisfactory. All of the judges make it clear both that the issue 
was not directly relevant to the instant case and that they reserved 
a final ruling. This means that all of the foregoing is obiter.
However, it is clear that the general feeling on the Supreme Court 
is strongly against doing away with the exclusionary rule. The 
difficulty this creates, as will be noted below, is that these 
statements made by judges in defence of the legislature may not 
reflect the Oireachtas’ understanding of the process. It is also 
possible that such judicial pronouncements do not accurately 
reflect practice. 
V. THE INTERPRETATION ACT 2005 
A. An Overview 
The Interpretation Act 2005 had a relatively long 
gestation.162 The Bill was initiated in August 2000 but was not 
_____________________________________________________
158 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 306 (SC). 
159 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 308 (SC). 
160 [2001] 3 I.R. 251 at 310 (SC). 
161 Cf. the discussion of the judgment in O’C. (S.) v. Governor of Curragh 
Prison [2001] IESC 68 in Mullan, “What is the Case for Pepper v Hart?” 
(2004) 26 D.U.L.J. (n.s.) 235, 254. 
162 Senator Brendan Ryan commented that “[t]his legislation … has been 
stewed over for the best part of five years.” 180 Seanad Debates 2272 
(Committee Stage, 29 June 2005). 
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passed by the Dáil until July 2003 and took almost two years to 
go through the Seanad. It was passed by that house in June 
2005163 and, after its final stages in the Dáil, came into force on 1 
January 2006.164
As the Bill was beginning this journey through the Houses 
of the Oireachtas, the Law Reform Commission published its 
report on Statutory Drafting and Interpretation: Plain Language 
and the Law165 in December 2000. This included a useful 
discussion of the principles of statutory interpretation and recent 
developments in other jurisdictions. It also contained 
recommended draft legislative provisions on the topic. The report 
led to some of the amendments which were moved by the 
Government while the Bill was making its way through the 
Dáil.166
Part 1 of the Act contains the usual preliminary material: 
title, commencement and interpretation. It repeals several 
previous Interpretation Acts, those of 1889, 1923, 1937 and the 
Amendment Act of 1993,167 although this is not to change the 
intent of some other enactment or create an absurdity in it.168 The 
first two acts, of 1889 and 1923, had been largely superseded in 
any case, as section 18 of the 1923 Act and section 5 of the 1937 
Act, respectively, had declared that they were no longer to be 
applied prospectively.
The previous acts did not repeal their predecessors but they did 
not apply to acts or instruments made after the succeeding act 
came into force. It does not repeal the Interpretation 
(Amendment) Act 1997 which operates only to protect the 
previous operation of common law rules which are repealed and 
any penalties incurred or proceedings brought under them.169
_____________________________________________________
163
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2000/5300/
default.htm 
164 Section 1 (2) of the Interpretation Act 2005. 
165 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 61. 
166 Minister Mary Hanafin, 557 Dáil Debates 670-71 (Second Stage, 14 
November 2002). 
167 Section 3 (1). 
168 Section 3 (2). 
169 See 557 Dáil Debates 669-70 (Second Stage, 14 November 2002). See also 
White, “The Present Prosecution of Abolished Offences”, (1998) 8 Irish 
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Part 2 of the Act is entitled ‘Miscellaneous Rules’. Section 5 
is the most important section here, and will be dealt with below. 
Section 6 provides that when construing legislation, a court may 
make allowances for changes in the law, social conditions, 
technology, the meaning of words used and “other relevant 
matters”. This section emerges from the Law Reform 
Commission report, which was critical of the current application 
of the ‘principle of updated construction’.170 The Commission 
recommended that the principle be explicitly adopted as part of 
the Act. “[T]his approach”, they argued, “has the merit of being 
consistent with the reasoning … recommend[ing] a general 
provision setting out a purposive approach to interpretation.”171
While the legislature may not have adopted the Commission’s 
wider recommendations on purposive legislation, the draft 
provision is included in the final Act. 
Section 7 specifies what version of the text of an Act which 
a court may make use of when construing a provision of an Act 
for the purposes of sections 5 or 6. This definitive text of an act is 
generally the signed text enrolled with the Office of the Registrar 
of the Supreme Court. This is specified to be “notwithstanding
section 18(g)”, which continues a long-standing, although 
sometimes ignored,172 prohibition on the use of marginal notes in 
interpretation. It seems, therefore, that when applying these two 
sections (but not at other times), the courts can consider marginal 
notes that appear in the enrolled version of the Act. 
Section 8 deals with a situation where an act provides that a 
specified person may prosecute a summary offence, that act is 
read together with another to create a summary offence, but it is 
not clear who is to prosecute this new offence: it can be 
prosecuted by the person specified in the first act. Section 9 
provides that references to divisions (parts, chapters, sections, 
etc.) of an act or provision are to be read as references to 
divisions within that act or provision. 
Criminal Law Journal 196, Grealis v. DPP [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 241 (SC) and 
Cummins v. McCartan [2005] IESC 67. 
170 See L.R.C. 61 – 2000, 26-7. See L.R.C. 61 – 2000, 41 et seq. See the case 
law at L.R.C. 61 – 2000, pp. 28 et seq.
171 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 36. 
172 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, pp. 41-42. 
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Section 10 provides simply that “[a]n enactment continues 
to have effect and may be applied from time to time as occasion 
requires.” (Unlike previous Interpretation Acts, this act uses 
‘enactments’ to refer to both primary and secondary legislation, a 
simplification which avoids the clumsy repetition of similar 
provisions for both categories in previous acts.) This is best 
explained by the marginal note, “Enactment always speaking.” 
This, presumably, is to be read as meaning that legislation, as 
with the Constitution, speaks in the present tense. A long-standing 
common law convention, this provision is a novelty in the 2005 
Act.
Section 11 provides that examples of the operation of a 
provision given in legislation do not exhaust the meaning of the 
provision, which should facilitate their use, recommended by the 
Commission.173 Section 12 protects non-material deviation from a 
form prescribed in legislation from invalidating that form. These 
are also new in the 2005 Act. 
Part 3 deals with the citation, commencement and exercise 
of powers under legislation. Section 13 provides that an act is a 
public document and must be judicially noticed; this is identical 
to section 6 (1) of the 1937 Act. Section 14 permits acts to be 
cited in various forms: by the long title, short title, the 
consecutive number and year or the regnal year and chapter 
number (for pre-Independence statutes). This is an expansion of 
section 7 of the 1937 Act, which permitted citation of post-
Independence statutes only by short title or consecutive number 
and year. It also provides that reference to an enactment is 
implicitly to the amended version. Finally, it provides that the 
short title of an act or the title of any other citation need not 
contain a comma before any reference to a year unless the comma 
is required for the purpose of punctuation. Section 15 provides 
that the date of the passing of an Act of the Oireachtas is the date 
on which the relevant Bill is signed by the President. This date is 
to be recorded on the act by the Clerk of Dáil Éireann. Section 16 
provides that an act comes into operation on the date that it is 
signed unless it provides otherwise, and that enactments come 
into operation at the end of the day before that day. In other 
_____________________________________________________
173 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p.77. 
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words, they come into operation at one second past midnight on 
the day that they are signed. These two sections reproduce 
sections 8 and 9 of the 1937 Act. Section 17 enables the use of 
commencement orders or other mechanisms to bring acts into 
force and permits the exercise of certain powers (such as making 
statutory instruments) under an Act once it is passed, if this is 
“necessary or expedient”. It is similar to section 10 of the 1937 
Act.
Part 4 deals with the meaning and constructions of words 
and expressions. Section 18 sets out a great deal of general rules 
of construction for, for example, singular and plural, gender and 
‘person’. This re-states the similar rules in section 11 of the 
Interpretation Act 1937. Section 18 (b) continues and extends the 
gender-proofing174 introduced in the Interpretation (Amendment) 
Act 1993. Section 18 (g) continues the prohibition in section 11 
(g) of the 1937 Act on the use of marginal notes in statutory 
interpretation (subject to the exception in section 7). 
Section 19, like section 19 of the 1937 Act, provides that 
words in statutory instruments have the same meaning as in the 
act under which the instrument is made. Section 20 provides that 
interpretation provisions apply to the act which contains them 
unless otherwise provided. Section 21 provides that the words 
listed in the schedule to the Act have the meanings given to them 
there. Part 1 of the schedule, which is broadly similar to the 
schedule to the 1937 Act, is both retrospective and prospective 
(applying to acts in force on 1 January 2006 and enactments 
coming in force after that date), while part 2 of the schedule is 
prospective only (applying only to enactments coming into 
operation after 1 January 2006). 
Part 5 deals with powers and duties under legislation, 
allowing them to continue to have effect rather than being 
exercised once and then exhausted. Section 22 provides that 
powers conferred by enactments can be exercised “as occasion 
requires”; that when conferred upon office-holders, they are 
conferred upon the holder for the time being; and that a power to 
make a statutory instrument includes the power to repeal or 
_____________________________________________________
174 See Byrne and McCutcheon, The Irish Legal System (4th ed., 2001), p. 475, 
fn. 41. 
2006] The Interpretation Act 2005 129
amend it. Section 23 makes similar provision with regard to 
duties. Section 24 provides that the extension or variation of the 
jurisdiction of a court brings with it a power for the relevant rule-
making body to make rules regulating practice and procedure 
relating to that jurisdiction. Section 25 defines what constitutes 
service by post. These largely mirror section 15 to 18 of the 1937 
Act.
Part 6 deals with amendment of legislation. Section 26 deals 
with the procedure for the coming into force of amendments, 
particularly for the continuation of existing arrangements under 
the former amendment, such as appointments, securities and legal 
proceedings. Section 27 similarly limits the ability of a repeal to 
affect existing arrangements and provides for the continuance of 
legal proceedings (either civil or criminal) in being at the time of 
repeal. These are similar to sections 19 to 22 of the 1937 Act; the 
principal difference is the new rules in section 26 for continuing 
existing arrangements. 
B. The Law Reform Commission and Section 5 of the Act 
1. The Commission’s Recommendations 
Discussing the Irish situation in the year after the 
introduction of the Interpretation Act 2000 and before Crilly was 
decided, the Law Reform Commission suggested the need for a 
uniform approach to statutory interpretation.175 The Commission 
noted “a strong line of judicial opinion” hostile to parliamentary 
history. Its members also believed that legislative history is 
usually of little use in interpretation. The Commission 
nevertheless concluded that “it should be open to a court to refer 
to Oireachtas debates” in limited situations.176 According to their 
report,
many judges admit to looking at these contextual 
materials in private, but omit[] to refer to them in 
_____________________________________________________
175 “[I]n general, there has been no uniformity … and an authoritative Supreme 
Court decision on the point is awaited with interest.” L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 58. 
176 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 60 and pp. 64-5.  
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their judgments. It is our strong view that any 
material which influences the decision of a court 
should be available to litigants. Thus, our position 
is intended to place what is currently widespread 
judicial practice on a more solid and transparent 
footing.177
They believed their proposal balanced the legal certainty of a 
“legislative framework”178 cataloguing admissible interpretive 
aids with considerable judicial discretion in weighing those aids. 
As such, no “particular category of extrinsic aid should be singled 
out for different treatment.”179
The Commission retained literal interpretation as the 
primary rule of interpretation. Section 1 of the draft legislation 
mirrors very closely the final text of the Act and seems to be 
rooted in the judgment in Mulcahy.180 As noted, the judgment and 
the Commission’s comments suggest consideration of ‘plain 
language’ and ‘plain intention’ in all cases.181 Arguably this is 
true, too, of the Executive obiter in the Dáil.182
In Section 2 of its draft legislation, the Commission 
suggested that where a literal interpretation was “ambiguous or 
obscure” or “would fail to reflect the plain intention of the 
Oireachtas”, extrinsic aids could be used. The meaning of 
‘ambiguous’ (and presumably also of ‘obscure’) is 
straightforward: “a situation where the meaning of a statutory 
provision, in relation to the facts of the instant case, is 
unclear.”183 As the Report notes, however, ‘absurd’ can have 
multiple meanings: self-contradiction, contradiction with other 
_____________________________________________________
177 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, 66. The Report notes Lord Lester’s comments on 
‘peeking’ by English judges in “Pepper v. Hart revisited” (1994) 15 Statute 
Law Review 10.  
178 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 67. 
179 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, pp. 67-8. 
180 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 88. 
181 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 20. See also recommendation 3 at p. 85. 
182 557 Dáil Debates 249 (Report and Final Stages, 1 July 2003, Minister 
Hanafin referring to the discussion of Denham J. in Howard).   
183 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 10. 
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portions of the enactment or even an effect that could not have 
been intended by the legislature.184
The Commission’s draft legislation, unlike the final Act, 
explicitly provided for the use of extrinsic aids in these 
circumstances. The process consists of an additional step beyond 
the literal and purposive approaches articulated in Mulcahy.185
Section 2 was thus necessary to authorise the use of the following 
extrinsic aids: 
(a) any document that is declared by the Act to be 
a relevant document for the purposes of this 
section;
(b) any relevant report of an Oireachtas committee; 
(c) any treaty or other International Agreement 
referred to in the Act; 
(d) any official explanatory memorandum relating 
to the Bill containing the provision;186
(e) the speech made by a Minister on the second 
reading of a Bill; 
(f) any other material from the official record of 
debates on the Bill in the Dáil or Seanad; 
(g) any publication of the Law Reform 
Commission or other official body that was 
published before the time when the provision was 
enacted; 
(h) legislation dealing with the same subject area 
as the provision being construed; 
(i) such other document as the court, for a 
particular reason, considers essential.187
_____________________________________________________
184 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 10. 
185 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 68. 
186 The failure to expressly deal with extrinsic aids in the Act creates at least 
one curious result. According to the Commission, explanatory memoranda are 
normally published at the introduction of legislation. While the Commission 
noted that the courts occasionally found them useful, they “enjoy[ed] no 
distinct status as a more authoritative type of extrinsic aid than the other 
categories already discussed.” L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 53.  In the event, two 
separate memoranda were drafted in the course of enacting the Act, one at its 
introduction and another after the Act was passed by both Houses of the 
Oireachtas. The status of such memoranda remains unclear. 
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These extrinsic materials were not, however, conclusive. They 
were admissible but their weight remained to be determined by 
the courts. This is consistent with academic commentary and goes 
some distance to meeting the English concerns expressed in the 
aftermath of Pepper.188 The Commission’s draft legislation 
suggested factors that might be considered in this determination 
of weight.189
The proposed sections were clearly an attempt to balance 
one another and reflect practice while ensuring that parliamentary 
history is used only in rare circumstances. 
2. Section 5 of the 2005 Act 
The Interpretation Act 2005 is the result of a long process of 
judicial development, scholarly commentary, and legislative 
activity. The most significant innovation is section 5 which is the 
first occasion on which legislation has explicitly addressed a 
general principle of statutory interpretation. The text of section 5 
(1) closely resembles the first element of the Commission’s 
proposals.190 It provides: 
In construing a provision of any Act (other than a 
provision that relates to the imposition of a penal 
or other sanction)— 
(a) that is obscure or ambiguous, or 
(b) that on a literal interpretation would be 
absurd or would fail to reflect the plain 
intention of— 
187 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 88. 
188 See the factors discussed in Beaulac, “Parliamentary Debates in Statutory 
Interpretation: A Question of Admissibility or of Weight?” (1998) 43 McGill 
Law Journal 287, 323. See also Vogenauer, “A Retreat from Pepper v Hart? A 
Reply to Lord Steyn” (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 629, 658-665. 
189 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 90. These were “the desirability of persons being able 
to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking 
into account its context in the Act; and the need to avoid prolonging any legal 
or other proceedings without compensating advantage”, “in addition to any 
other relevant matters”. 
190 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 24. 
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(i) in the case of an Act [of the 
Oireachtas], the Oireachtas, or 
(ii) in the case of an Act [continued 
in force by Article 50 of the 
Constitution], the parliament 
concerned,
the provision shall be given a construction that 
reflects the plain intention of the Oireachtas or 
parliament concerned, as the case may be, where 
that intention can be ascertained from the Act as a 
whole.
Section 5 (2) makes similar provision for statutory instruments.191
Both resemble the Commission’s draft provisions. These seem to 
modify the two-step process outlined in section IV.A above 
slightly. Where the provision is obscure, ambiguous or literally 
absurd, the procedure is the same and a purposive interpretation is 
sought. If these tests are not met, a court previously could choose 
to consider what in Mulcahy was called the ‘true legislative 
intention’ and is here called the ‘plain intention of the Oireachtas’ 
(if it is ascertainable from the Act as a whole). Now, however, to 
determine whether a construction, even following a literal 
approach, “would fail to reflect the plain intention” of the 
Oireachtas requires a purposive interpretation. The second step 
has become mandatory rather than optional, although the end 
result will likely be the same in most cases. 
The text does not, however, permit or prohibit an enquiry 
beyond statutory text. The draft provisions relating to the 
admissibility and weight of extrinsic aids were not introduced, 
discussed, or enacted in the Oireachtas.
C. The Intention of the Houses of the Oireachtas? 
The intention of the Houses of the Oireachtas, the ratio
legis, appears to have been to codify current judicial practice and 
retain the exclusionary rule. But both executive and legislative 
_____________________________________________________
191 Their construction is to reflect “the plain intention of the maker of the 
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assumptions about judicial policy and practice seemed to vary 
considerably from those of the judiciary. Indeed, comments made 
in the Dáil and Seanad seem to suggest an intention to allow the 
courts to examine Oireachtas debates, at least in some very 
limited circumstances, based on the widespread belief that this 
was common practice.192
At the Second Stage in the Dáil, Deputy Hanafin, Minister 
of State at the Department of the Taoiseach, laid out the purpose 
of the Act as she saw it: to update statutory interpretation in 
response to general constitutional, statutory, and judicial 
developments.193 Deputy Jan O’Sullivan asked “whether the 
placing of this principle of interpretation on a statutory footing is 
intended to give rise to the presumption that other canons of 
statutory construction, some of more respectable vintage but 
which have not been so elevated, are being effectively 
abolished.”194 Arguably, since the Commission’s 
recommendations were intended to reflect practice the failure to 
enact all of its recommendations is a change in the law. While we 
suggest that legislative silence here was an attempt to permit 
judicial development to continue, the extent to which the 
Oireachtas understood judicial practice is unclear. 
Discussion of both the Commission’s Report and judicial 
practice was slight and anecdotal and many legislators were 
clearly exasperated by the complexities of the Bill. Commenting 
on the “highly technical Bill” in the Committee Stage, Deputy 
Bruton noted the omission of “the debates of the Houses of the 
Oireachtas which would make quite plain the intention of the 
Oireachtas in deciding and voting on amendments or sections.”195
In her response, the Minister of State stated that the Bill “is 
intended to provide a statutory basis for what the courts are 
already doing”.196 She suggested that room was being left for 
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192 See, e.g., 180 Seanad Debates 2308 (Report and Final Stages, 29 June 
2005). An Opposition amendment to explicitly permit reference to the 
Oireachtas debates was opposed in the Seanad. See 180 Seanad Debates 2308 
(Report and Final Stages, 29 June 2005).   
193 557 Dáil Debates 670 (Second Stage, 14 November 2002).  
194 557 Dáil Debates 674-75 (Second Stage, 14 November 2002). 
195 29FPS1, No. 4 Dáil Debates 149-150 (Committee Stage, 22 January 2003). 
196 29FPS1, No. 4 Dáil Debates 150 (Committee Stage, 22 January 2003). 
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judicial development and noted that the Government did not want 
to depend on Executive interpretations inserted in the Oireachtas 
debates.197 Deputy Bruton replied, “I do not accept that the Act as 
a whole includes the Dáil debate on it.”198  Minister Hanafin 
insisted that 
Anything that would help in the interpretation of 
legislation is important. In many circumstances 
Oireachtas debates have helped in that 
interpretation and the courts have used this. My 
understanding of the section, however, is that it 
does not preclude them from doing this. They may 
still continue to look at the Oireachtas debates to 
see the intention behind legislation.199
While she also cited the Commission’s comments about the 
difficulties of using legislative history, the Minister failed to 
mention their recommendation to permit the use of such history.
Neither does she clarify her statements on practice,200 nor is it 
clear whether ‘use’ refers to ‘peeking’ or opening by counsel.  
While we could not undertake the empirical investigation 
necessary to confirm current practice, the number of cases where 
the courts have referred to the debates are small and it does not 
seem to be an accepted practice.
The representatives of the Executive made similar remarks 
in the Seanad. In a discussion initially about Section 7 of the Bill, 
the Government spokesman, Minister Kitt, insisted that “[t]he 
courts examine Oireachtas debates but the danger of stipulating 
that they should do so is that it would make the law more 
imprecise.”201 This is consistent, of course, with arguments for 
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197 29FPS1, No. 4 Dáil Debates 151 (Committee Stage, 22 January 2003).   
198  29FPS1, No. 4 Dáil Debates 151 (Committee Stage, 22 January 2003).  
199  29FPS1, No. 4 Dáil Debates 151 (Committee Stage, 22 January 2003).  
200 She does briefly mention Mulcahy at 570 Dáil Debates 251 (Report and 
Final Stages, 1 July 2003). Interestingly, there was even a hint of Lord Steyn’s 
estoppel argument in the Report and Final stages of the Interpretation Bill. See 
Deputy Burton’s comments in reference to proposed amendment (No. 10) to 
the Bill at 557 Dáil Debates 250 (Report and Final Stages, 1 July 2003). 
201 180 Seanad Debates 2287 (Committee Stage, 29 June 2005). 
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the exclusionary rule while simultaneously denying that it is 
applied.  The objections were also similar to those made in the 
Dáil. Senator Ryan, for example, argued that “[i]t should be made 
clear that judges may examine them. All of us accept they 
examine the debates.”202 After Minister Kitt again insisted the 
courts may look to the Oireachtas debates, Senator Ryan added: 
I am concerned that by outlining what the court 
may do, the Minister of State is also stating what it 
may not do. If it does not mean the courts are 
prevented from doing other things, the section is 
unnecessary but if it means they are prevented 
from doing other things, then the section is 
outlining only what they may do. The courts do 
not have to do everything outlined but it is clear 
they may not do any more.203
While this exchange petered out, the issue came up again in the 
Report and Final Stages.204 There, Senator Ryan moved an 
amendment to allow the courts to explicitly use the debates. 
Senators Hayes and Quinn agreed. Minister Kitt rejected the 
amendment, referring to the decision in Wavin Pipes as well as 
the debates on Pepper. Once again, at no time in this exchange 
was mention made of the Commission’s recommendations on 
extrinsic aids. Judicial practice was never clarified. 
The Law Reform Commission’s Report was mentioned, and 
indeed cited, by Minister Kitt when the Dáil went into Committee 
to consider Seanad amendments. There he offered an eloquent 
defence of the judicial development of the use of extrinsic aids. 
“It is felt”, he said, “that the Irish judiciary should be allowed to 
develop further the principles it applies to the use of extrinsic aids 
in respect to purely domestic legislation.”205 When pressed on the 
Seanad amendments, however, to expressly permit reference to 
such aids in the Bill, he concluded that “[t]he current position is 
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that it does not prevent the courts from using debates of the Dáil 
and Seanad. That was the advice I was given, which I am glad to 
share with the House.” 206
D. The Separation of Powers 
Finally, the Law Reform Commission was not troubled by 
any separation of powers issues in preparing its report. The new 
Interpretation Act was simply the latest in a string of such 
legislation. The Commission emphasised “that under Ireland’s 
constitutional arrangements, it is the function of the legislature to 
make the law, and of an independent judiciary to interpret it. 
None of the proposals which we make can, or should, undermine 
this vital demarcation line.”207 Separation of powers questions 
cannot be considered in greater detail here due to lack of space, 
but the Oireachtas debates suggest a divergence of understanding 
amongst the branches of government. 
The issue was explicitly, if curiously, referred to in the Dáil. 
Deputy O’Sullivan expressed a deep suspicion of the courts’ view 
of the role of legislature. She suggested that the Act might 
represent “a shift of power from the Oireachtas to the courts”, 
perhaps providing “a licence for judicial legislation.”208 In the 
context of her remarks, this is likely simply confusion over the 
long-standing judicial application of—and legislative 
acquiescence to—the ‘golden rule’ in those instances, however 
rare, where statutory text is ambiguous or unclear. But such 
comments are especially interesting in light of the recent more 
restrained view of the courts’ role in the separation of powers.209
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207 L.R.C. 61 – 2000, p. 7. Cf. “Separation of powers’ principles would suggest 
that if a judge knows, or can reasonably be expected to know, what the 
Oireachtas intended the effect of the Act to be, then he or she is bound to give 
effect to that intention.” Ibid., 18. See also Ibid., 43. 
208 557 Dáil Debates 674 (Second Stage, 14 November 2002). See 557 Dáil 
Debates 675. In the Committee Stage, Deputy Burton ended her remarks by 
stating that “[t]he Bill gives additional powers of interpretation.” 29FPS1, No. 
4 Dáil Debates 175 (Committee Stage, 22 January 2003). 
209 See, e.g., Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] 2 I.R. 505 and T.D. v. 
Minister for Education [2001] 4 I.R. 259. See also Morgan, A Judgment Too 
Far?: Judicial Activism and the Constitution (2001). 
                   Judicial Studies Institute Journal                     [6:1 138
This view is consistent with adherence to the exclusionary rule 
and was a development contemporaneous with Crilly.
Deputy O’Sullivan suggested it was “more realistic” to 
state:
…that the detail and complexity of much modern 
legislation is such that the average legislator does 
not even attempt to get to grips with it, especially 
if it outside his or her own brief or area of interest. 
In this view, Deputies and Senators are not so 
much the authors of legislation as bystanders, with 
only limited capacity to intervene and listen to a 
conversation taking place between the Executive, 
via its draftsman, and the law courts. There is 
something slightly bogus about grandiloquent 
references to “the intention of the Oireachtas” in 
passing a specific statute. There is also something 
unattractive about a system of justice which places 
a premium on the ability of legal advocates to spot 
defects in legislation that can be exploited to their 
clients' advantage.210
On the one hand, such a statement (if true) suggests significant 
difficulties in the use of parliamentary history and seems to 
confirm the importance of the exclusionary rule. On the other 
hand, it does so only by a far more critical, perhaps realistic, 
perspective on the idea of legislative intent. Both the courts and 
the legislature speak of ‘plain intention’, but it may be that neither 
have a clear understanding of the realities of the process of 
legislating.
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210 557 Dáil Debates 674 (Second Stage, 14 November 2002). Cf. the 
comments on the American system in Breyer, “On the Uses of Legislative 
History in Interpreting Statutes” (1992) 65 Southern California Law Review
845, 858. 
2006] The Interpretation Act 2005 139
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Commission’s proposals were modest. It appears that 
their intention was to ensure that statutory context is consulted 
only to supplement rather than supplant the ordinary meaning of 
statutory text. In their Report, they also made strong arguments in 
favour of the occasional use of parliamentary history. However, 
the Commission’s suggestions on extrinsic aids were not enacted. 
In Crilly, decided as the Commission was completing its work 
and the Bill was in its early stages, the Supreme Court expressed 
in strong terms its reluctance (albeit in obiter) to use 
parliamentary materials. 
Senator Ryan overstated the point when he noted that he 
was “intrigued that the Interpretation Bill 2000 is going to be one 
of the most difficult pieces of legislation to interpret”,211 but it is 
easy to be sympathetic.212 One possible interpretation of the 
Oireachtas not implementing the Commission’s recommendations 
is that it intended to continue the exclusionary rule. However, 
peeking at the debates in search of the subjective intent of the 
Oireachtas provides only dim guidance rather than a ‘flood of 
light’, leaving the issue in an unclear state. Case law and the 
comments of the Oireachtas suggest contrasting views of what 
current judicial practice is and ought to be, indicating that this is a 
question which is unlikely to have a clear answer for some time. 
The Oireachtas has, however, explicitly required a limited 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation. The impact of the 
Act on current practice is likely to be minimal but its 
development could be quite interesting. The legislation is of 
considerable importance to all concerned–judges, practitioners 
and legislators–and merits careful study and consideration. 
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